Attribution of Mutual Understanding by Vogel, Ph.D., Carl
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 21
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM:
Authorship Attribution Workshop
Article 6
2013
Attribution of Mutual Understanding
Carl Vogel, Ph.D.
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Carl Vogel, Ph.D., Attribution of Mutual Understanding, 21 J. L. & Pol'y (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol21/iss2/6
 377 
ATTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING 
Carl Vogel*  
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores advances in a method of analysis of 
conversational interaction, as recorded through text transcripts, 
for evidence of grounding in order to quantify certainty of 
mutual understanding. It is necessary to take into account 
aspects of communication in which certainty of having arrived at 
a common understanding of dialogue content must be 
pessimistically assessed. It may be that in many or even most 
contexts, the urgency of the linguistic elements of 
communication is negligible. It is a relatively rare event for 
linguistic acts, independently of other forms of communication, 
to have a distinctive, measurable, impact on human survival, 
and therefore, where such events exist, they tend to be 
spectacular.1 That a failure to achieve mutual understanding does 
not typically result in catastrophic events does not constitute 
                                                          
* Computational Linguistics Group, O’Reilly Institute, Trinity College 
Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland (vogel@tcd.ie). Thanks are due to Lawrence Solan 
for organizing the Brooklyn Law School Authorship Attribution Workshop 
and his acknowledgement of the breadth of problems that fall into the 
category of linguistic attribution in legal contexts. Additionally, I am very 
grateful to Carole Chaski for discussions of this material and for making me 
aware of the work of Linda Smith.  
1 See, for example, the discussion of Flying Tiger Flight 66, on 
February 19, 1989, in which the air traffic control directive, “descend two 
four zero zero” was evidently understood as having a preposition, “to” rather 
than a numeral “two,” with the consequence that the aircraft flying at an 
altitude of 400 feet crashed into a hill 437 feet above sea level, killing all 
four people on the aircraft. STEPHEN CUSHING, FATAL WORDS: 
COMMUNICATIONS CLASHES AND AIRCRAFT CRASHES 14 (1994). 
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sufficient evidence to suggest that conversation is generally 
successful. It appears to be largely a matter of doctrine whether 
communicators are assumed to generally understand each other 
and signify the same ideas with the same language—this is 
known as the doctrine of intersubjective conformity.2 The 
skeptical position that neither interlocutors (the participants in 
dialogues) nor external observers can ever completely verify 
whether the interlocutors have really understood each other is so 
robust that this skeptical position cannot be refuted. However, a 
weaker notion of intersubjective conformity is available. The 
weaker notion is that dialogue participants or observers may 
pragmatically behave as if there has been mutual understanding 
unless contrary evidence emerges. Nonetheless, in some 
contexts, forensic ones in particular, it seems safer to adopt the 
null hypothesis about communicative success which holds that 
communication attempts have been unsuccessful unless positive 
evidence exists that mutual understanding has emerged 
sufficiently to make one reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that communication has been successful, 
rather than to assume success by default.  
This article focuses on the development and testing of 
objective measures for assessing the likelihood of shared 
understanding of linguistic communication in contexts where 
shared understanding has a critical role, such as in forensic 
interrogations or other courtroom interactions. After motivating 
a principle of skepticism in assessing the likelihood of mutual 
understanding emerging for all participants in any given 
dialogue, a method is described which is deployed here to 
quantify levels of engaged interaction as a proxy measure for 
mutual understanding. The basic idea is that where positive 
evidence is needed to assert that dialogue participants have 
understood each other, levels of interaction that are statistically 
significant in divergence from random interactions provide a 
tangible basis for asserting that corresponding levels of mutual 
understanding may have been achieved. The method is 
illustrated with respect to an excerpt of a dialogue transcript 
                                                          
2 TALBOT J. TAYLOR, MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING: SCEPTICISM AND 
THE THEORIZING OF LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION 29 (1992).  
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about which it is relatively easy for third party observers to 
form opinions about the communicative success achieved, then 
the method is applied to two transcripts available in public 
records of cases in which levels of mutual understanding has 
been contested. It is argued that the method of analysis is able to 
contribute useful facts to debates about the level of mutual 
understanding achieved in dialogues in which that form of 
communicative success matters.  
Many contexts of legal interpretation are primed by 
principles associated with criminal trials, rigorously applied 
(i.e., “presumed innocent, unless proven guilty”). Presently, it 
is argued that the null hypothesis regarding the success of 
linguistic communication is that language use is ineffective 
unless proven effective.3 This statement is jarring on first 
encounter because language use in communication is largely 
taken for granted as being as effective as the use of language in 
thought. However, one need only reflect on the many sorts of 
ambiguity that exist in language (i.e., sonic, syntactic, semantic) 
as well as their potential for combinatoric increase in the 
number of potential meanings to realize how great the chances 
are for miscommunication to arise through linguistic channels.4 
Indeed, much literature about theories, models, and simulations 
                                                          
3 See id. at 30. Taylor presents such arguments at a meta level, in 
relation to possible rebuttals and resolutions; here, the proposal is to make do 
with this skeptical position rather than to argue against it. See generally id. 
4 Consider an example:  
Suppose a sentence has three ambiguous lexical items and two 
(disjoint) places with attachment ambiguities; even if each ambiguity 
allows only two possibilities, the sentence will have, in principle, 
25 = 32 interpretations. A simple example satisfying this description 
is given in (7); others would be easy to construct. 
7. Old friends and acquaintances remembered Pat’s last time in 
California. 
Here old can mean aged or long-term (or former) and can modify 
either friends and acquaintances or just friends; last can mean final 
or previous; time can mean occurrence or duration (e.g. if Pat was a 
racer), and in California can modify remembered or time. 
Thomas Wasow et al., The Puzzle of Ambiguity, in MORPHOLOGY AND THE 
WEB OF GRAMMAR: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF STEVEN G. LAPOINTE (C. Orhan 
Orgun & Peter Sells eds., 1998). 
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of language evolution explores the emergence of linguistic 
systems from the assumption that the first communicators began 
with shared thoughts and built language on prior, shared, 
thought.5 When the context of communication is legal, given its 
conventional location of burden of proof, it can be more 
important to attempt to quantify the level of understanding that 
could have been achieved by linguistic means, for example, 
during testimony, particularly when nonnative speakers of a 
language are involved.6  
Consider the following transcript of a courtroom dialogue7:  
                                                          
5 Of course, this bootstrapped semantic infallibility, or “telepathy” 
approach is not universal in the language evolution literature. See, e.g., 
Andrew D.M. Smith, The Inferential Transmission of Language, 13 
ADAPTIVE BEHAV. 311, 311–23 (2005); Martin Bachwerk & Carl Vogel, 
Establishing Linguistic Conventions in Task-Oriented Primeval Dialogue, 
PROC. COST 2102 INT’L CONF., 2010, at 48–55; Martin Backwerk & Carl 
Vogel, Language and Friendships: A Co-Evolution Model of Social and 
Linguistic Conventions, 9TH INT’L CONF. ON EVOLUTION LANGUAGE, 2012, 
at 34–41; James R. Hurford, Biological Evolution of the Saussurean Sign as 
a Component of the Language Acquisition Device, 77 LINGUA 187, 187–222 
(1989) (analyzing the biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a 
component of the language acquisition device); James R. Hurford & Simon 
Kirby, Co-Evolution of Language-Size and the Critical Period, in SECOND 
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND THE CRITICAL PERIOD HYPOTHESIS 39, 39–63 
(David Birdsong ed., 1999); James Hurford, The Evolution of the Critical 
Period for Language Acquisition, 40 COGNITION 159, 159–201 (1991); Simon 
Kirby, Syntax Without Natural Selection: How Compositionality Emerges 
from Vocabulary in a Population of Learners, in THE EVOLUTIONARY 
EMERGENCE OF LANGUAGE: SOCIAL FUNCTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
LINGUISTIC FORM 303, 303–23 (James Hurford et al. eds., 2000). 
6 The burden of proof is not identically located in all legal contexts. In 
contract law, it is typical to presume that an individual understands the 
contractual issues, including the fine print; for example in relation to arguing 
the invalidity of a contract on the basis that it presupposes mistaken 
assumptions, “[t]he basic rule is that a mistaken assumption must be shared 
and be of fundamental importance if it is to be the basis for setting aside an 
otherwise valid contract. This is rarely satisfied.” STEPHEN A. SMITH, 
CONTRACT THEORY 283 (1993). Extra measures are needed to establish the 
invalidity of a contract due to deliberate drafting obfuscation, but this can be 
achieved. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–49 (1995). 
7 People v. Herrero, 756 N.E.2d 234, 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
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BASTOUNES Mr. Herrero is a Spanish speaking 
individual. We ordered an interpreter and 
he isn’t here. He understands well enough 
that if you want you can admonish him on 
the record. He understands well enough 
what is going on in terms of picking this 
jury. He doesn’t have a problem and wants 
to proceed this way. Perhaps we should put 
that on the record and tomorrow morning 
when we do opening statements and 
evidence  
COURT  Mr. Herrero would you step up here, 
please.  
BASTOUNES I’m for sure that we would have an 
interpreter.  
BRODE  We would like to put on the record that 
neither one of these individuals ever 
needed an interpreter.  
BASTOUNES I think the first time I was here with Mr. 
Herrero at the bond hearing didn’t we? I 
just wanted to be sure that the record is 
clear and that there is no alleged error later 
on we will want an interpreter for the trial 
and it should be no problem getting one 
tomorrow.  
BASTOUNES For the record I have discussed with my 
client Mr. Herrero his desire to proceed 
this afternoon with picking the jury and he 
has indicated to me that he understands and 
wish well enough for that portion of the 
trial and wants to proceed.  
BASTOUNES Mr. Herrero, is it your desire now to 
proceed with picking the jury? 
HERRERO  Yes.  
BASTOUNES Without an interpreter?  
HERRERO  Yes.  
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BASTOUNES Do you understand what I’m saying to you 
now, is that correct?  
HERRERO  Yes.  
BASTOUNES Okay. Judge, if you want to inquire 
further.  
* * * 
COURT  Mr. Herrero, have you understood the 
conversation that has taken place in the last 
ten minutes or so?  
HERRERO  I understand a little bit.  
COURT  Mr. Herrero, do you have any objection to 
picking the jury now without the 
interpreter?  
HERRERO  No.  
COURT  Okay. All right, then we can proceed. 
We’re going to try to get an interpreter.  
BASTOUNES I did try earlier.  
COURT  We’re trying now, I put in the request.  
This transcript was reviewed during an appeal by Hector 
Herrero of a drug possession conviction and twenty-five year 
sentence.8 The crux of the appeal was since Herrero had a poor 
understanding of the English language and was not aided by a 
translator, he was effectively absent from the trial.9 While the 
appeal was not successful, it was not due to Herrero’s claims 
about linguistic ability.10 Even though the question of whether 
the transcript reveals that the defendant did not understand 
English sufficiently to be deemed present at the trial did not 
                                                          
8 Id. at 242–43. 
9 Id. at 242–45. 
10 See id. at 243–44 (“The decision to appoint an interpreter is within the 
trial court’s discretion, and a conviction will be reversed only when an abuse 
of the court’s discretion deprived the defendant of some basic right. . . . 
Defendant did not ask for an interpreter at any time during jury selection. 
Nor did defendant raise this issue in his motion for new trial. Consequently, 
the issue is waived . . . . Even if we were to find that this issue was not 
waived, defendant would still not prevail.”). 
 ATTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 383 
determine the appeal in this case, it would be beneficial in 
related circumstances to be able to quantify certainty of 
interlocutor involvement in the dialogue. Interlocutor 
involvement is the degree to which dialogue participants are 
engaged in the conversation; this is more than the frequency and 
balance of turn-taking, since a virtual monologue with 
interleaved vocalizations such as “uh-huh” can demonstrate 
ample turn-taking with little engagement. Notably, in this 
example, the defendant provided answers to yes-no questions 
that were coherent as a set. This appears to evidence a greater 
level of engagement than if those turns were uniformly “yes.” 
On the other hand, the defendant says little in each question-and-
answer to suggest that there was genuine understanding of what 
the binary responses entailed, except the hedge, “I understand a 
little bit.” There is no restatement in the defendant’s own words 
of what was understood. It is precisely a method of quantifying 
likelihood of understanding that is described and argued 
appropriate for such forensic contexts in this article. Part III 
returns to this transcript.  
In assessing mutual understanding in conversation, it is 
important to be clear about what constitutes a null hypothesis 
and where the burden of proof lies in establishing an alternative 
hypothesis. Its relevance is illustrated by the fact that the 
question of whether the evolutionary niche of language is as a 
cognitive tool for thought or as a cognitive tool for 
communication remains a topic of debate. This is part of a 
debate about whether language is a socially evolved construct or 
a biologically evolved one. It is natural to compare human 
language and human vision in this context. The eye is a delicate 
and highly functional product of biological evolution. In 
contrast, flaws of the linguistic system, including ambiguity at 
every level of linguistic description, leave language as a poor 
medium for communication. If one were to design a visual 
system from scratch, the eye as it is now would likely be a part. 
If one were trying to evolve a system as well-suited to 
communication as the eye is for vision, one would strive for 
telepathy rather than human language.11  
                                                          
11 Cf. Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom, Natural Language and Natural 
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On the other hand, language is a very good system in which 
to conduct thought, and it serves very well for mental 
representation and reasoning about a plethora of complex 
matters. While a speaker may be sometimes vague, typically one 
who utters an ambiguous sentence has an intended reading in 
mind. Some topics of potential thought remain notably ineffable, 
(i.e., thoughts of extreme pain or pleasure or profoundly spatial 
topics such as geographic directions—precious few people are 
adept at expressing in words only, without recourse to gesture or 
maps, how to navigate from one point to another in a city that 
does not have a grid-based street system), but for the most part, 
it is difficult to imagine human thought without language.12  
Given the fundamental flaws of human languages as media 
for communicating toward mutual understanding, there are 
strong reasons to view the null hypothesis about human 
communication in a pessimistic light. In the absence of strong 
evidence to the contrary, human interaction through dialogue 
does not reach mutual understanding of the language each other 
has used in dialogue to describe the world, much less mutual 
agreement that the world is (or should be) the way that 
interlocutors understand each other to describe it. A shared 
understanding of the world may come from common 
embodiment, the fact that humans share much of their genetic 
constitution and occupy the same niche in the ecosystem with 
each other, independently of agreement arising from 
communication, or from communication nurtured without 
language used in the process.13 I claim that the appropriate null 
hypotheses about the outcome of language use is not that 
utterances were interpreted as uttered for all parties to a 
conversation and agreed in their truth relations to the described 
world; rather, the null hypothesis pertaining to ordinary dialogue 
is that communication did not make obvious the existence of 
disagreement about meanings and the relations between those 
claims and the world.  
                                                          
Selection, 13 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 707, 784 (1990). 
12 See MICHAEL NEWTON, SAVAGE GIRLS AND WILD BOYS: A HISTORY 
OF FERAL CHILDREN 20–21 (2002). 
13 See STEVEN STROGATZ, SYNC: HOW ORDER EMERGES FROM CHAOS IN 
THE UNIVERSE, NATURE, AND DAILY LIFE 264 (2003). 
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Literature written about pragmatic theory14 notes that 
interlocutors may arrive at working hypotheses by coming to the 
realization that they have been talking about the same things, 
understanding each others’ comments about those things, and 
agreeing about the propositional contents put forward on all 
sides.15 Much of this literature appeals to processes of 
grounding, which provides a foundation for the speculative 
conclusions that interlocutors have understood each other.16 
Grounding ultimately is anchored in repetition of words, 
phrases, and syntactic structures among interacting agents.17 
Detailed conversation analysis has been deployed in legal 
contexts to emphasize the significant effort necessary to achieve 
the effect that clients feel understood by their lawyers, for 
example.18 Repetitions provide linguistic mechanisms that may 
be used to develop confidence that conversation has not resulted 
in misunderstanding.19 Differential use of repetition according to 
authority and expertise among interlocutors has been pointed 
out,20 but in general for all parties in conversation, repeated 
information is taken to be more securely placed in common 
ground.21  
                                                          
14 Herbert H. Clark & S.A. Brennan, Grounding in Communication, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIALLY SHARED COGNITION 127–29 (Lauren B. Resnick 
et al. eds., 1991). See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING VOICES: 
REPETITION, DIALOGUE, AND IMAGERY IN CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE 
(2007). 
15 It is one thing to mutually understand that the content of some 
utterance is the proposition pq, and it is another to agree that the 
proposition pq is true. 
16 See generally Paul Vogt & Federico Divina, Social Symbol Grounding 
and Language Evolution, 8 INTERACTION STUD. 31–32 (2007). 
17 Clark & Brennan, supra note 14; TANNEN, supra note 14.  
18 See, e.g., Linda F. Smith, Always Judged—Case Study of an Interview 
Using Conversation Analysis, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 423 (2010). 
19 Cf. PATRICK HEALEY, COMMUNICATION AS A SPECIAL CASE OF 
MISUNDERSTANDING: SEMANTIC COORDINATION IN DIALOGUE (1996). 
20 Eve V. Clark & Josie Bernicot, Repetition as Ratification: How 
Parents and Children Place Information in Common Ground, 35 J. CHILD 
LANGUAGE 349, 364 (2008). 
21 Clark & Brennan, supra note 14; TANNEN, supra note 14. 
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In certain contexts of urgency, grounding mechanisms are 
part of the ritual of communication designed to avoid 
miscommunication.22 The rituals of air traffic communication 
emphasize repetition in order to reduce potential 
misunderstanding arising from conversation.23 Repetition of 
words and phrases has been analyzed as providing a means for 
interlocutors to increase their involvement in dialogues.24 
Accordingly, it follows that enhancing the involvement of 
aircraft cockpit personnel via repetition increases the chances of 
a shared understanding of the matter being spoken of by 
increasing joint immersion in the context at hand. Conscious 
repetition incrementally eliminates chances that the interlocutors 
are focused on distinct perspectives on the immediate context.  
This article describes and evaluates a method of analysis that 
can be used to measure engagement in interaction. Where 
interactions are assessed with respect to these measures, it is 
possible to quantify certainty that interlocutors have successfully 
communicated. A growing body of research develops automated 
and semiautomated methods of measuring synchronization 
among dialogue participants in terms of such analysis.25 This 
measure is argued here to correlate with mutual understanding. 
Some scholars have examined laboratory constructed task-based 
dialogues in order to correlate effects associated with repetition 
                                                          
22 CUSHING, supra note 1, at 40. 
23 Id.  
24 See TANNEN, supra note 14, at 84.  
25 See, e.g., Junko Itou & Jun Munemori, Repetition of Dialogue 
Atmosphere Using Characters Based on Face-to-Face Dialogue, 6278 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED & INTELLIGENT INFORMATION & ENGINEERING SYS. 527 
(2010); Fabian Ramseyer & Wolfgang Tschacher, Nonverbal Synchrony or 
Random Coincidence? How to Tell the Difference, 5967 DEVEL. 
MULTIMODAL INTERFACES: ACTIVE LISTENING & SYNC. 182 (2010); David 
Reitter et al., Computational Modelling of Structural Priming in Dialogue, 
PROC. HUM. LANGUAGE TECH. CONF., N. AM. CHAPTER ASS’N FOR 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS ANN. MEETING, 2006, at 121; David Reitter & 
Johanna D. Moore, Predicting Success in Dialogue, PROC. 45TH ANN. 
MEETING ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS, 2007, at 808; Carl Vogel 
& Lydia Behan, Measuring Synchony in Dialog Transcripts, 7403 COGNITIVE 
BEHAV. SYS. 73 (2012). 
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with task-oriented success.26 In the present work, transcripts of 
dialogues from outside laboratory settings are analyzed. Rather 
than considering repetition counts up to a point in time from the 
beginning to an evaluation point in the dialogue, repetitions of 
tokens as a proportion of total tokens that could have been 
repeated between an utterance and immediately preceding 
utterances are considered.27 The level of mutual understanding 
experienced by the interlocutors is in all cases studied here 
subjectively assessed, independently through the sources from 
which the data is drawn. In cases where the method does not 
support the conclusion that mutual understanding has been 
achieved, the independent assessments historically provided 
appear to agree with the conclusions drawn through analysis 
using the method. The critical cases are those where it is a main 
issue whether one of the participants understood what was going 
on, and outside the laboratory environment, it is seldom possible 
to obtain independent measures of mutual understanding among 
dialogue participants. Thus, the role of this article is to provide 
evidence from relatively clear cases that the measurements 
suggested are valid as a proxy for assessing mutual 
understanding and to show their efficacy by pointing out the 
contributions they make in cases that are open to greater debate 
about the levels of mutual understanding that were likely to have 
been experienced.  
It is not possible to directly measure the actual degree of 
mutual understanding—neither as a dialogue participant nor as 
an outside observer. However, the extent to which synchrony 
and grounding behaviors indicate mutual understanding is the 
extent to which it may be quantified. If there is no evidence of 
synchronized engagement, the basis for certainty that there is 
mutual understanding is undermined. Where even low levels of 
synchrony are evident, the level of certainty that mutual 
understanding is in place is correspondingly increased. The 
method of quantification is to quantify levels of repetition in 
dialogue. Where repetition differs from chance expectations, 
                                                          
26 See Reitter et al., supra note 25, at 122; Reitter & Moore, supra note 
25, at 809. 
27 See Vogel & Behan, supra note 25, at 75. 
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pragmatic inferences may be drawn. The occurrence of such 
instances has led to the development of a typological theory of 
functions of repetition.28 The distinction between allo-repetition 
and self-repetition corresponds to distinctions in the pragmatics 
of attending to others and attending to oneself. However, this 
correspondence is not total in that, for example, allo-repetition 
serves (at least) the purpose of reassuring an initial speaker that 
a message has been heard but also increasing confidence for the 
speaker who repeats that the message was at least correctly 
heard. Self-repetition has a strong relationship with persistence 
in a dialogue plan. Inversely, allo-repetition avoidance (in its 
strongest form, a refusal to adopt the language of one’s dialogue 
partners) manifests a focus on the self, and self-repetition 
avoidance can indicate the absence of an independent dialogue 
plan. The absence of a significant difference in repetition 
between actual and randomized dialogues entails a lack of 
engagement according to that measure and retention of the null 
hypothesis that mutual understanding was not achieved. This 
conclusion is based on studies that quantify repetition in 
mutually engaged conversation29 and communication that leads to 
success in collaborative tasks.30 
This discussion began with an argument that the null 
hypothesis about linguistic success in ordinary conversation 
should be that language did not yield mutual understanding; 
however, in certain legal contexts, the normal burden of proof 
necessitates even greater caution in assuming that linguistic 
communication has been successful. The methods discussed here 
can be used to mitigate risks associated with inappropriately 
rejecting that null hypothesis. In what follows, a range of 
dialogues are used to illustrate a theory of repetition in dialogue. 
The ramifications of the research are as relevant to forensic 
                                                          
28 Note that this is on a different scale of analysis than that of Deleuze of 
the general epistemological effects of repetition, but is rather restricted to 
linguistic pragmatics, and as such is a contribution to the framework 
associated with Tannen. See generally GILLES DELEUZE, DIFFERENCE & 
REPETITION (Paul Patton, trans., Athlone Press 2004) (1968); TANNEN, supra 
note 14. 
29 See generally Vogel & Behan, supra note 25, at 73–88. 
30 Reitter & Moore, supra note 25. 
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contexts as to safety in air traffic communications: measures of 
conversational synchrony can be used to mitigate doubt about 
the extent to which, for example, interrogated individuals have 
understood the nature of conversations in which they participate, 
including, for example, the extent of understanding about 
Miranda rights.31  
The paper is structured as follows. First, a method is 
described for analyzing interaction in dialogue with respect to 
interlocutor alignment. The algorithmic core of this method has 
been employed in the analysis of a range of natural dialogues as 
recorded in available textual transcripts.32 The essence of the 
method is the evaluation of the degree to which the various 
forms of repetition are visible between actual dialogues and a 
number of randomized reorderings of the dialogue turns. Where 
precise temporal alignment information is available, overlap and 
other temporal features of synchronization may also be 
measured. Lydia Behan and I illustrated how the measures are 
manifest in natural conversations representative of types: one in 
which discussion is casual and mutually supportive among 
participants of equal social standing and another in a crisis 
situation with a clearly defined leader (an aircraft crash 
transcript).33 The work here extends the methods of statistical 
analysis further and in directions that support forensic 
deployment of the method in the attribution of interlocutor 
engagement and understanding of critical legal discourse, for 
purposes such as police interview, courtroom testimony, and 
cross-examination. The theory developed here is that where 
actual repetitions do not exceed random counterparts at all, there 
is reason to think that the dialogue exemplifies lack of 
engagement and misunderstanding (or rather, there is no reason 
to reject the null hypothesis in such a case). Similar assessments 
are considered with respect to individual participants within the 
dialogues.  
                                                          
31 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding 
that an accused person must be made aware of his or her constitutional rights 
upon arrest, including the right to remain silent). 
32 See generally Vogel & Behan, supra note 25, at 73–88. 
33 Id. at 77–87. 
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I. METHODS 
In all cases, the dialogues analyzed here have already been 
independently transcribed and are available on the web or in 
publications cited. The importance of this, given the intention to 
study repetition across successive dialogue turns, is that the turn-
taking structure of dialogue has been determined independently, 
without evidence of prior reflection on the possibility of this sort 
of analysis being undertaken. Temporally, the transcripts are 
partially ordered given that contributions of interlocutors are 
interleaved; however, temporal overlap analysis is not 
conducted. Ideally, one would have available not just textual 
transcripts that indicate the sequence of turns but also the timing 
of those turns so that temporal overlap of turns can be taken into 
account. However, as with the dialogues analyzed here, one 
cannot be guaranteed the availability of timing information.  
A decision has to be made with respect to the level of 
linguistic description at which to consider repetition 
(tokenization): morphemes, words, part-of-speech (“POS”) 
labels, concepts, etc. or combinations thereof. The units of 
representation decided on are types, and their instances are 
tokens. At this stage, punctuation marks are disregarded. 
Representation of semantic information that is not directly 
lexically encoded is not made, since it is not safe to conclude 
that speakers accept as true all logically valid consequences of 
their assertions. The text is individuated as words and restricted 
part-of-speech labeling. POS labeling is only used for personal 
pronouns to capture the fact that, ordinarily, they are not 
repeated verbatim but with complementarity, in dialogue that 
proceeds successfully. Thus, the sole other treatment of the data 
analyzed here (apart from ignoring punctuation) is to transform 
dialogues in the form of examples like those numbered below 
(1) and (3) into those like (2) and (4), respectively; that is, 
complementary first-person and second-person personal 
pronouns are replaced with a single item (“IY,” regardless of 
grammatical number). No deeper parsing is deployed and no 
other POS labels are used; even third-person pronouns are left 
intact. Avoiding parsing is desirable to ensure that the methods 
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are replicable and not dependent on any particular theory of 
natural language syntax.  
(1) A: Do you understand? 
B: I understand.  
(2) A: Is this your address? 
B: Yes, this is our address  
(3) A: Do IY understand? 
B: IY understand.  
(4) A: Is this IY address? 
B: Yes, this is IY address  
The tokens counted in the analysis are sequences of words 
and POS labels of this form; these are known as n-grams. The 
value of n varies between one and three. Thus, in the treated 
dialogue fragment (2) above, B is regarded as repeating two 
unigrams and one bigram from A’s utterance. In (4), B is 
counted as repeating four unigrams and one bigram. Since they 
are sequences, word order matters, and “this is” does not count 
as a repetition of “is this,” even though there is a natural 
syntactic complementarity between English subject-auxiliary 
verb inversion in polar questions and the canonical ordering of 
the subject and verb in answers, just as there is lexical 
complementarity in pronouns. The equation of the two bigram 
forms is not made here because of the decision to avoid the need 
to parse texts. If one were to take syntactic structures into 
account, then one could consider structural complements as well.  
For each transcript processed, the algorithm for data 
extraction designates a location of memory called a “register” 
for each speaker. The register, which is initially empty, 
eventually contains the contents of the most recent contribution 
of the corresponding speaker.34 A generalization of the method 
would afford each speaker a vector of registers in order to 
evaluate repetitions arbitrarily far back in a conversation. In the 
work described here, the single register for each speaker is 
initially empty, but it subsequently records the last contribution 
                                                          
34 Register machines or abacus machines with registers form a standard 
theoretical model of computation. See GEORGE S. BOOLOS ET AL., 
COMPUTABILITY AND LOGIC 45–62 (4th ed. 2002). 
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made by that speaker. This remains a structural definition, since 
it is not constrained temporally.  
For each utterance, the tokens35 are compared with those 
recorded in the register for each actor, counting those tokens 
that are shared between the utterance and its speaker’s own 
register (selfshared; AKA self-repetition) and counting those 
tokens which are shared with utterances recorded in the registers 
of each of the other speakers (othershared; AKA allo-repetition). 
Then the speaker’s register is updated to contain the most 
recently processed utterance. The token counts are conducted for 
each level of n-gram. Repetitions of n-grams (again, 1 ≤ n ≤ 3) 
are recorded as counts with respect to the values in the registers 
as either “SelfShared” or “OtherShared” tokens. In measuring 
the degree of sharing for a turn ui, these figures are regarded as 
proportions of the total number of n-grams for each level of n 
that could have been shared, given the length of ui, between the 
turn and the immediately preceding turns as recorded in the 
registers for each actor. In analyzing the three levels of n it is 
useful to think of there actually being two levels, lexical 
(unigrams) and phrasal (bigrams and trigrams), and therefore 
this factor is accordingly presented in terms of a derived factor 
Nbar with levels “1” and “2+.”  
The actual repetition values are then compared with those 
derived from some number (ten, in each of the experiments 
here) of randomized reorderings of the turns (AKA 
contributions). The constituent words within any individual 
contribution are left intact in their original order; the reordering 
is of entire turns with respect to other turns into a random 
partial ordering. This method supports the level of repetition 
analysis by speaker or aggregated across speakers comparing 
self-repetition and self-repetition of sequences as manifest in 
actual dialogues and their turn-randomized counterparts. Forms 
of repetition are deemed significant in their visibility when the 
difference between the actual and randomized counterparts is 
statistically significant.  
                                                          
35 The tokens are in sequences—sequences of words or sequences of POS 
tags, etc., depending on the choice of tokenization.  
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Dialogues are reordered by generating new start-times and 
durations for each utterance as turn indices. The times and 
durations are selected using random generators based on 
parameters that depend on the values in the original 
conversation. Thus, for each utterance ui a re-indexing úi is 
constructed. The ú are sorted on their temporal indices. Analysis 
of duration of overlaps is enabled by this framework but not 
conducted here given that the transcripts addressed are not 
annotated temporally beyond the relative order of turns. Where 
temporal annotations are available, the analysis of 
synchronization may have greater depth with the inclusion of 
consideration of temporal overlap. In the reordered dialogue, 
counts of allo-shared tokens and self-shared tokens are recorded, 
just as with actual dialogue. The variables measured and 
analyzed here are as specified in Table 2. The results allow for 
the depiction of many contrasting proportions; however, the 
specific contrasts of interest are whether actual repetition of 
unigrams and n-grams for larger values of n exceeds the random 
counterparts for any speaker. Thus, the null hypotheses tested in 
each dialogue are as in (5) and (6).  
(5) Randomized.Speaker.1 – Actual.Speaker.1 ≥ 0  
(6) Randomized.Speaker.2+ – Actual.Speaker.2+ ≥ 0  
The data is analyzed in each case using a generalized linear 
model with a binomial error family.36 Adjustments are made for 
multiple comparisons using directed tests for significance, 
wherein the null hypothesis essentially is that where 
DialogType = Randomized repetition will equal or exceed 
repetition for the corresponding Actual case.37 
                                                          
36 Within R, this is using the following:  
glm(OSprop~DialogType*Speaker*Nbar,family=binomial) and  
glm(SSprop~DialogType*Speaker*Nbar,family=binomial). 
37 With the R multcomp package, the following representative constructs 
are used:  
fos <- interaction(DialogType,Speaker,Nbar), 
mfos <- glm(OSprop~fos,family=binomial), 
mfos.mc <- glht(mfos,linfct = mcp(fos = "Tukey"),alternative="l"). 
See FRANK BRETZ ET AL., MULTIPLE COMPARISONS USING R (2011). 
Subsequently, all tests are discarded which do not hold constant Speaker and 
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Table 2: Variables Analyzed   
Variable  Interpretation 
 
DialogType  actual vs. randomized 
OtherSpeakers  total number of participants, minus one  
n length of  n-grams (1, 2 or 3) 
n-bar n-gram length as a two-level factor (“1” or 
“2+”) 
Nbar  n-bar
NGrams  total number of n-grams in a turn 
SelfShared  count of tokens from turn shared with own 
prior contribution 
OtherShared  count of tokens from turn shared with prior 
contribution of other 
ss  SelfShared 
os  OtherShared 
SSrel  SelfShared / NGrams 
OSrel  OtherShared / (NGrams * OtherSpeakers) 
NonSelfShared  NGrams-SelfShared 
NonOtherShared  (NGrams * OtherSpeakers)-OtherShared  
nss  NonSelfShared 
nos  NonOtherShared 
SSprop SelfShared,NonSelfShared 
OSprop  OtherShared,NonOtherShared 
II. A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
The method of analysis advocated here provides an index of 
synchronized engagement in conversation. This section addresses 
an example of conversation that has been independently 
transcribed and analyzed in order to provide a reference point 
for assessing levels of engagement as a proxy measure of mutual 
understanding in cases that are selected as more contentious and 
discussed in Part III. The example is one in which opinion 
evidently converges on the notion that the conversation does not 
exemplify mutual understanding.  
                                                          
Nbar and vary solely DialogType. 
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In a BBC television interview in 1997, Jeremy Paxman 
interviewed Michael Howard, the former Home Secretary in the 
UK government.38 The text, prior to treatment as described in 
Part I, is included in Appendix A. The transcript of the Howard 
interview is a relatively famous example of an interview in 
which questions were asked directly, but did not yield 
responsive answers. If the interlocutors were not both native 
speakers of English, one might reach the generous conclusion 
that Howard did not understand the question asked by Paxman. 
Abstracting over the context, with knowledge of the roles 
involved—news presenter and politician—one is more likely to 
infer evasiveness on the part of the politician, since the language 
used is not manifestly complex. In any case one can conclude 
from the text of the discussion that the conversation did not 
instantiate a collaborative flow of information. This conversation 
is a useful one to show how the proposed measures fare in 
assessing the level of mutual engagement exemplified. This is 
demonstrated below. 
The mean counts of shared tokens by levels of n are 
provided in Table 3. 
 
    
Table 3: Shared token counts in the Paxman-Howard interview 
 OtherShared SelfShared  
   
n-bar 1 2+ 1 2+  
     
Actual  4.71 1.94 3.04 .06  
Randomized  4.24 1.58 2.88 .01  
 
The statistical significance of repetitions is assessed by 
comparing the proportions in token counts that were shared 
between each utterance and its immediately preceding utterance 
of the totals that could have been shared in each case. For 
neither speaker, for neither level of n in the comparisons here is 
                                                          
38 See Interview by Jeremy Paxman with Michael Howard, former U.K. 
Home Sec’y, Newsnight (BBC television broadcast May 13, 1997), available 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uwlsd8RAoqI.  
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the actual repetition (OS,SS) a significantly greater proportion of 
total tokens that could have been shared (OS+NOS,SS+NSS) 
for actual dialogue than in the randomized case. The proportions 
in the comparisons here are depicted as follows: allo-repetition 
in Figure 1 and self-repetition in Figure 3. The graphs depict the 
relevant proportions. Of the two sorts of dialogue type, the area 
occupied by the counts for “Randomized” dialogue is necessarily 
larger than the area for “Actual” dialogue because there are ten 
random reorderings of the actual dialogue. Within the sorts of 
“Other-Sharing” (for either of the two dialogue types) the 
instances of sharing of items that are shared (“OS”) tends to be 
much smaller than the number of items that could have been, 
but were not, “other-shared” (hence, the label, “NOS”). It is 
apparent that Howard spoke more than Paxman, but the contrast 
of interest is in the proportions shared and not shared between 
the actual and randomized conditions for the two individuals. 
Thus, the mosaic plot39 in Figure 1 does not show any significant 
difference in allo-repetition for either speaker between the actual 
and randomized dialogues. The same information, with an 
additional contrast, is shown in Figure 2: here, the proportion of 
shared and nonshared unigrams and n-grams, for values of 
n > 1 aggregated, are shown to illustrate the proportions as they 
depend on the length of expressions, for allo-repetition in this 
dialog. Recall that the precise statistical tests are used probe ((5) 
and (6)) for each level of n-bar throughout; however, the graphs 
which do not separate the levels of n-bar demonstrate the main 
relationships discussed more clearly. Figure 3, which shows the 
same proportions for self-repetition, looks different to Figure 1, 
because Paxman repeated more of his own utterances (“SS”) in 
relation to his own unrepeated items (“NSS”) than Howard 
repeated of his own utterances. However, for neither Paxman 
nor Howard is the difference significantly greater for the actual 
dialogue than the randomized counterparts. 
 
                                                          
39 David Meyer et al., The Strucplot Framework: Visualizing Multi-Way 
Contingency Tables with VCD, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, Oct. 2006, at 1 (“A 
mosaic plot is basically an area-proportional visualization of (typically, 
observed) frequencies, composed of tiles (corresponding to the cells) created 
by recursive vertical and horizontal splits of a rectangle.”) (citations omitted). 
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Table 4: 1997 Paxman-Howard interview: counts of shared and nonshared 
tokens by dialogue-type, speaker, and n-bar 
  OtherSharing               SelfSharing  
 DialogTypeActual  Randomized Actual  Randomized  
Speaker Nbar  OSNOS OS NOS SS NSS SS NSS 
Howard  1  43 154 435 1435 46 151 423 1547 
 2+  1 357 4 3576 12 346 125 3455 
Paxman 1  30 91 256 954 67 54 594 616 
 2+  2 204 3 2057 81 125 631 1429 
 
 
Figure 1: Allo-repetition by Paxman & Howard: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Figure 2: Allo-repetition by Paxman & Howard: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker and n-bar in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Figure 3: Self-repetition by Paxman & Howard: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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The lack of significance in the difference between the actual 
and randomized dialogues in the direction taken as of interest 
here suggests that the dialogues might as well have had the turns 
randomly reordered to obtain the same overall effect of 
engagement. Certainly, it is clear that the repetitions of the 
Paxman questions makes self-repetition high for Paxman but not 
substantially different in the ten randomized reorderings. 
Similarly, Howard’s repetition of terms used by Paxman is 
relatively impervious to reordering. The statistical effects reveal 
that at the level of textual content, there is little engagement 
exhibited. Accordingly, this leaves open that an analysis 
including gesture, timing of utterances, or overall energy 
measurable in the scene during the flow of the dialogue could 
still detect involvement and engagement at that level,40 just as 
speakers of mutually unintelligible languages may interact with 
engagement but without full understanding. The lack of 
significance in the contrasts of interest here implies that, 
although it seems that willful avoidance might be at issue, one 
cannot say for certain that Paxman and Howard reached an 
understanding of each other.  
It is interesting to note that it is relatively difficult to find 
transcripts of naturally, publicly occurring dialogues in which 
third party observers conclude that the interlocutors do not 
understand each other. Fabrications of such are the stuff of 
comedy, such as the “Who’s on first” routine of Abbott and 
Costello. The Paxman-Howard example was selected as a 
relatively famous example of failure to communicate. With more 
successful dialogues, it is generally not true that in all cases all 
parties will support measurements according to the methods used 
here in which the actual dialogue differs in the hypothesized 
direction from the ten turn-randomized alternatives. Where there 
is significant self-repetition but no significant allo-repetition for 
any of the participants in a dialogue, it would seem that there is 
evidence of persistence but not of linguistic engagement. 
Conversely, where allo-repetition effects are significant, but not 
self-repetition, there is evidence of understanding and 
engagement. Where neither of the effects is visible for any of 
                                                          
40 Ramseyer & Tschacher, supra note 25. 
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the participants, the conversation is difficult to classify as 
successful. It is not safe, in such a case, to make judgments 
about the level of mutual understanding achieved among the 
participating parties.  
III. LEVELS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN SAMPLE CASES 
The next two sections present analyses of transcripts which 
represent the sorts of situations in which one might expect the 
methods described here to have benefit. In the present context, 
they constitute evaluations of the method to the extent that the 
conclusions supported by the method are in agreement with 
independent historical assessments of the conversations.  
A. Case Study 1: People v. Herrero41 
The data the first case study relies upon has been described 
in the introduction.42 The data is treated and processed according 
to the methods specified, with the actual dialogue giving rise to 
ten counterparts in which the turns have been randomly 
reordered with respect to each other.  
1. Results 
As before, the proportions of allo-repetition43 and self-
repetition44 are analyzed. Notably, Herrero has higher levels of 
both OS and SS in the randomized versions of the dialogue than 
in the actual dialogue. Furthermore, recall that the testing 
conducted is directional and the null hypothesis is that random 
repetition will exceed or equal actual repetition in the proportion 
measures ((5) and (6)). 
  
                                                          
41 People v. Herrero, 756 N.E.2d 234, 242–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
42 See supra Introduction. 
43 See infra Figure 4. 
44 See infra Figure 5. 
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Figure 4: Allo-repetition in the Herrero case: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Figure 5: Self-repetition in the Herrero case: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Table 5: Herrero case: counts of shared and nonshared tokens by dialogue-
type, speaker, and n-bar 
 
   Other 
Sharing 
 Self Sharing 
 DialogTypeActual  Randomized  Actual  Randomized  
Speaker  Nbar  OS NOS OS NOS  SS NSS SS NSS 
           
BASTOUNES1  63 613 737 6073  52 175 490 1780 
 2+  7 2450 105 24465  16 803 92 8098 
BRODE  1  7 47 92 448  0 18 0 180 
 2+  2 184 14 1846  0 62 0 620 
COURT  1  34 164 288 1692  17 49 124 536 
 2+  2 640 223 6398  3 211 13 2127 
HERRERO  1  3 24 27 243  2 7 13 77 
 2+  0 30 0 300  0 10 0 100 
 
 
Recall that the null hypothesis asserts that there is no more 
repetition in actual dialogue than in randomized counterparts. 
The contrasts between actual and randomized dialogues are not 
significant enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis for 
any participant nor for any level of n-bar, whether for self-
repetition or allo-repetition.  
2. Discussion 
The results of applying the method suggest that the null 
hypothesis must be retained: the dialogue does not present 
sufficient repetition of words or phrases to suggest that the 
interlocutors have engaged sufficiently to achieve mutual 
understanding. Despite the fact that the answers to the questions 
posed provided by Herrero are rational and mutually consistent, 
particularly given that the individual is a nonnative speaker of 
English and given that the answers are all one-word responses to 
polar interrogatives, there simply is not sufficient evidence here 
and on these measures to support the claim that Herrero 
understood the proceedings. In the actual legal case, as 
discussed in the introduction, the final decision did not hinge on 
the answer to the question of whether the defendant understood 
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the proceedings. The dialogue was produced to the Illinois 
Appellate Court, First District, with an implicit argument that 
the responses of the defendant were contextually appropriate, but 
with a null hypothesis about whether this is evidence of mutual 
understanding that is at odds with the arguments given in the 
introduction.45  
B. Case Study 2: State v. Cunningham46 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard an appeal in 
which the defendant sought a new trial because of faulty jury 
selection. The transcript of jury selection was considered to 
assess whether a particular potential jury member, Carnes, 
whose exclusion from the jury was not permitted, had been 
predisposed towards a particular verdict or understood the notion 
of presumed innocence. Defense counsel Murphy tried to 
explain the notion of presumed innocence and attempted to 
ascertain whether Carnes understood. Occasionally, Wolfe, for 
the prosecution, and the Court intervened. As an independent 
reader of the transcript of the relevant jury selection process, it 
is easy to form the opinion that Carnes did not understand what 
it meant to accept the concept of presumed innocence.47  
1. Results 
Table 6 shows the distribution of token counts across the 
categories studied. Figure 6 depicts the relative proportions of 
shared vs. nonshared tokens in the case of allo-repetition. None 
of the contrasts of interest are statistically significant for allo-
repetition (i.e., actual vs. randomized tokens produced by each 
speaker for each level of n-bar, repeating tokens from the last 
turns of all of the other speakers). Figure 7 shows the same 
                                                          
45 Herrero, 756 N.E.2d 234. 
46 State v. Cunningham, 474 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1996). The transcript is 
included in App. B. The data used here is taken from the public records of 
the State of North Carolina. State v. Cunningham No. 232A91, IBIBLIO, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/nc-supreme-court/jun0493/cunningham.asc 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
47 See State v. Cunningham No. 232A91, supra note 46. 
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proportions for self-repetition. Self-repetition effects are 
significant for Murphy (the defense attorney questioning the 
potential juror) and Carnes (the juror being questioned) in that 
actual repetition exceeds repetition in randomized dialogues, for 
both unigrams and 2+ grams (adjusted p ≤ .01). The effect also 
exists for the court with respect to unigrams (adjusted p ≤ .01). 
Actual repetition of 2+ grams is not significantly in excess of 
randomized repetition for the court, and neither level of n-gram 
yields significant actual self-repetition for Wolfe (the 
prosecutor). 
 
Figure 6: Allo-repetition in the Cunningham case: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Figure 7: Self-repetition in the Cunningham case: shared vs. nonshared 
tokens by speaker in actual and randomized dialogue 
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Table 6: State v. Cunningham: counts of shared and nonshared tokens by 
dialog-type, speaker, and n-bar 
  Other Sharing Self Sharing 
 DialogType Actual  Randomized  Actual  Randomized  
Speaker  Nbar  OS NOS OS NOS SS NSS SS NSS 
          
CARNES  1  159 933 1627 9293 110 254 558 3082 
 2+  30 1827 285 18285 65 554 119 6071 
COURT  1  175 1238 2029 12101 110 361 761 3949 
 2+  32 2623 315 26235 42 843 295 8555 
MURPHY 1  261 2679 4023 25377 324 656 2462 7338 
 2+  23 5575 451 55529 80 1786 316 18344 
WOLFE  1  11 100 163 947 4 33 46 324 
 2+  1 167 14 1666 1 55 10 550 
 
2. Discussion 
Applying the method proposed to the data examined here 
supports the conclusion that the prosecutor and potential juror 
persisted in their respective communication strategies. The fact 
that allo-repetition effects that distinguish the actual dialogue 
from its ten randomized counterparts do not appear strengthens 
the argument that mutual understanding did not emerge during 
the interaction. This analysis coincides with the determination on 
appeal that the jury member did not unambiguously demonstrate 
understanding of the concept of presumed innocence.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
While the current work is in the spirit of the traditions in 
statistical methods for authorship attribution,48 it is focused on 
                                                          
48 See generally GEORGE U. YULE, THE STATISTICAL STUDY OF 
LITERARY VOCABULARY (1944) (examining word-distribution from different 
portions of author’s works throughout history); Harald Baayen et al., Outside 
the Cave of Shadows: Using Syntactic Annotation to Enhance the Authorship 
Attribution, 11 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 121, 121–32 (1996) 
(reporting an experiment in which statistical measures and methods previously 
applied to words and their frequencies of use are applied to rewrite rules); 
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the attribution of mutual understanding and engagement in 
dialogue. The distinguishing features sought are not linguistic 
(words and phrases) in themselves but patterns of their use. 
Hence, the method can be considered to provide a tool for 
quantifying pragmatics. Other algorithmic means have been used 
to assess levels of understanding and awareness in dialogue. 
Apart from the explicit use of lexicalized feedback tags (e.g., 
“eh?”, “I see”), information contained in prosody has also been 
studied.49 In analysis of other dialogues, the methods underlying 
                                                          
Carole E. Chaski, Empirical Evaluations of Language-Based Author 
Identification Techniques, 8 INT’L J. SPEECH LANGUAGE & L. 1, 1–65 (2001) 
(testing language-based author identification techniques based on syntactic 
analysis, syntactically classified punctuation, sentential complexity, 
vocabulary richness, readability, content analysis, and errors); Carole E. 
Chaski, Who’s at the Keyboard? Authorship Attribution in Digital Evidence 
Investigations, 4 INT’L J. DIGITAL EVIDENCE, Spring 2005, at 1, 1–13 
(applying computational, stylometric authorship attribution methods to crimes 
involving digital evidence); Jack Grieve, Quantitative Authorship Attribution: 
An Evaluation of Techniques, 22 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 251, 
251–70 (2007) (comparing thirty-nine different types of textual measurements 
commonly used in authorship attribution studies to determine which 
measurements are the best indicators); David I. Holmes, Authorship 
Attribution, 28 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 87, 87–106 (1994) (quantifying 
literary style and looks at several variables to find the stylistic “fingerprints” 
of a writer); Kim Luyckx & Walter Daelemans, Shallow Text Analysis and 
Machine Learning for Authorship Attribution, PROC. FIFTEENTH MEETING 
COMPUTATION LINGUISTICS IN NETH., 2005, at 149–60, available at 
http://lotos.library.uu.nl/publish/articles/000139/bookpart.pdf (reporting on 
the use of syntax-based features as possible predictors for an author’s style 
and token-based features that are predictive to author style); Harold Somers 
& Fiona J. Tweedie, Authorship Attribution and Pastiche, 37 COMPUTERS & 
HUMAN. 407, 407–29 (2003) (testing whether authorship attribution 
techniques can distinguish between a deliberate imitation and its model); Carl 
Vogel & Gerald Lynch, Computational Stylometry: Who’s in a Play?, in 
VERBAL AND NONVERBAL FEATURES OF HUMAN-HUMAN AND HUMAN-
MACHINE INTERACTION 1, 169–86 (2008) (applying automatic text 
classification techniques to quantifying strength of characterization within 
plays); George U. Yule, On Some Properties of Normal Distributions, 
Univariate and Bivariate, Based on Sums of Squares of Frequencies, 30 
BIOMETRIKA 363, 363–90 (1938) (evaluating univariate and bivariate 
distributions and squaring every ordinate). 
49 See generally Jens Edlund et al., The Effects of Prosodic Features on 
the Interpretation of Clarification Ellipses, 2005 PROC. INTERSPEECH 2389 
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the current work yield significant differences between actual and 
randomized repetitions, which support the inference that 
significant engagement has happened, giving more certainty to 
attributions of mutual understanding,50 thereby supporting the 
face validity of the methods. Further, recall that face validity is 
found elsewhere, in the correlation between repetition levels and 
task success in task-based dialogue.51  
The capacity to assess and attain mutual understanding from 
a position external to a dialogue is important outside forensic 
contexts. The capacity to reliably and objectively make such 
attributions is also relevant in clinical diagnostics. Moreover, 
even if repetition behaviors do not figure explicitly into 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual diagnoses of schizophrenia, 
analysis of repetition figures into current concepts of 
schizophrenia,52 including attention to whether such analyses can 
lead to inappropriate diagnoses.53 In preliminary study in this 
                                                          
(describing an experiment in when subjects listened to short dialogue 
fragments and judged what was actually intended by the elliptical 
clarification, based on prosodic features); Jens Edlund et al., User Responses 
to Prosodic Variation in Fragmentary Grounding Utterances in Dialog, 
PROC. INTERSPEECH 2006, at 2002 (testing whether subjects change their 
behavior to different fragmentary grounding utterances in a human-computer 
dialogue setting). 
50 Vogel & Behan, supra note 25. 
51 See Reitter & Moore, supra note 25, at 808–15. 
52 See generally Michael Covington et al., Schizophrenia and the 
Structure of Language: The Linguist’s View, 77 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 85, 85–
98 (2005) (evaluating schizophrenic language impairments to see how 
schizophrenia affects phonology, syntax and semantics); Gina R. Kuperberg, 
Language in Schizophrenia Part 1: An Introduction, 4 LANGUAGE & 
LINGUISTICS COMPASS 576, 576–89 (2010) (discussing language output in 
schizophrenia and the theory that language dysfunction in schizophrenia arises 
from abnormalities in semantic memory and/or working memory and 
executive function); Gina R. Kuperberg, Language in Schizophrenia Part 2: 
What Can Psycholinguistics Bring to the Study of Schizophrenia . . . and Vice 
Versa?, 4 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASS 576, 590–604 (2010) 
(applying online psycholinguistic methods to schizophrenic language). 
53 See Susan Trumbetta et al., Language-Related Symptoms in Persons 
with Schizophrenia and How Deaf Persons May Manifest These Symptoms, 1 
SIGN LANGUAGE STUDIES 214, 228–53 (2001). 
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area,54 transcripts previously analyzed by Steuber55 in the 
identification of linguistic features that discriminate transcripts of 
interviews with individuals diagnosed with either schizophrenia 
or depression have been considered, finding no significant level 
of repetitions of others, but individual persistence via self-
repetition. The potential use of the methods proposed in the suite 
of tools for diagnosis of syndromes with distinctive 
accompanying effects on conversational linguistic abilities is an 
area ripe for deeper exploration using the methods demonstrated 
here.  
This article has introduced a method of interaction analysis 
based on repetition analysis that is distinct in analytical details 
from other analytical methods in the literature. The use of the 
methods has been demonstrated by analyzing transcripts that are 
freely available and with respect to which it is possible to draw 
upon independent assessments of the degree to which the 
transcribed conversations demonstrate engaged interaction and 
mutual understanding. Allo-repetition effects are taken to be 
those where the repetitions of tokens by an individual of 
dialogue partners immediately preceding contributions, summed 
over the conversation, significantly exceed in actual conversation 
the same measurement averaged over turn-randomized 
treatments of the conversation. Self-repetition effects are those 
where in the cumulative counts of repetitions of a speaker’s 
immediately prior contribution significantly exceed for actual 
conversation the averaged accumulated counts for randomized 
counterparts. Self-repetition effects are taken to be indicative of 
speaker persistence with dialogue plans. Allo-repetition effects 
are taken to be signals of mutual engagement in dialog, and the 
conversations where these effects appear accord with 
independent intuition about the level of engagement and mutual 
understanding (distinct from mutual agreement) achieved within 
                                                          
54 Carl Vogel, Quantifying Interaction Synchrony as Evidence of Mutual 
Understanding, 49 CORTEX (forthcoming 2013). 
55 Lucas C. Steuber, Disordered Thought, Disordered Language: A 
Corpus-Based Description of the Speech of Individuals Undergoing Treatment 
for Schizophrenia (2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Portland State Univ.), 
http://dr.archives.pdx.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/psu/7087/Steuber_psu_0180 
E_10321.pdf?sequence=1. 
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the conversation. Thus, the method is put forward for further 
exploration in contexts that require quantified analysis of 
attributions of mutual understanding in linguistic interaction. The 
argument made here is that where actual allo-repetition in a 
dialogue is not significantly in excess of its counterpart measure 
in randomized versions of dialogue, the level of engagement is 
insufficient to make confident attributions of mutual 
understanding.  
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Appendix 
A. Transcript of Interview with Michael Howard56 
 
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  I was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis and I did not
instruct him.
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  The truth of the matter is that Mr. Marriot was not
suspended  
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  I did not overrule Derek Lewis 
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  I took advice on what I could or could not do 
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  and acted scrupulously in accordance with that advice.
I did not overrule Derek Lewis 
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  Mr. Marriot would not suspend him 
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  I have accounted for my decision to dismiss Derek
Lewis  
Paxman  Did you threaten to overrule him? 
Howard  in great detail before the House of Commons 
Paxman  I note that you’re not answering the question whether 
you threatened to overrule him. 
Howard  Well, the important aspect of this which it’s very clear
to bear in mind 
Paxman  I’m sorry, I’m going to be frightfully rude but—I’m 
sorry—it’s a straight yes-or-no question and a straight 
yes-or-no answer did you threaten to overrule him?  
Howard  I discussed the matter with Derek Lewis. I gave him
the benefit of my opinion. I gave him the benefit of my
opinion in strong language, but I did not instruct him
because I was not, er, entitled to instruct him. I was 
entitled to express my opinion and that is what I did.  
                                                          
56 Yuri Prime, Newsnight, EVERYTHING2, http://everything2.com/title/ 
Newsnight (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
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Paxman  With respect, that is not answering the question of
whether you threatened to overrule him. 
Howard  It’s dealing with the relevant point which was what I
was entitled to do and what I was not entitled to do, 
and I have dealt with this in detail before the House of
Commons and before the select committee.
Paxman  But with respect you haven’t answered the question of
whether you threatened to overrule him. 
Howard  Well, you see, the question is. . . .
 
B. Transcript of Contested Jury Member Selection in State v. 
Cunningham.57  
 
MURPHY  Do you understand, Ms. Carnes, that we have at law 
what is called the presumption of innocence, that is, 
a person who is charged with a criminal offense is 
presumed to be innocent until and unless the State 
can prove that person’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt?  
CARNES  Yes, sir. 
MURPHY  You understand that, don’t you? 
CARNES  Yes, sir, I do. 
MURPHY  And, of course, you understand that the charge in 
this particular case is first-degree murder. It 
involves the shooting of a police officer. Do you 
understand that? 
CARNES  Yes, I do. 
MURPHY  And one of the things that you will be called upon to 
do is to apply the principles that we were talking 
about to this particular case if you sit as a juror.  
CARNES  Yes, I do. 
MURPHY  Now, it is one thing, of course, to say that you can 
do something and it may be entirely different.  
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  That is, that you actually be able to do that, and that 
is really what I want you to search yourself about. I 
                                                          
57 State v. Cunningham No. 232A91, supra note 46. 
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want you to think about that. You seem to be one 
who holds your opinion strong, and that’s fine. 
Given that you have such a strong feeling about the 
death penalty in your statement that if a person takes 
another life, they should be put to death, given that 
Mr. Cunningham is charged with first-degree 
murder, as you sit there today, can you honestly say 
to yourself, not to me necessarily but to yourself, 
that you are able to presume Mr. Cunningham 
innocent? 
CARNES  Until he is proven guilty. 
MURPHY  Do you expect that to happen? 
WOLFE  Object.  
COURT  Sustained. 
CARNES  I don’t know. 
COURT  Don’t answer the question when I sustain it. 
MURPHY  I understand that if he is proven guilty of first-
degree murder, then that would remove the 
presumption of innocence, but that is really not what 
I am asking you. Okay? What I am really asking 
you at this point is can you honestly, as he sits there 
right now, and as you sit in that seat right now, and 
nobody knows this any better than you, I’m just 
asking, can you honestly presume him to be 
innocent? 
CARNES  Yes, because I don’t know what happened. 
MURPHY  Now, part and parcel of the principle of the 
presumption of innocence is the defendant’s right not 
to testify, not to present any evidence if he doesn’t 
want to, because he doesn’t have that burden. The 
State has the entire burden of proof in a criminal 
case to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt of a 
person’s guilt, if they can do that. Okay? Now, 
would it present a problem for you in returning a 
verdict of not guilty if the State fails to prove to you 
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt and 
Mr. Cunningham didn’t testify?
CARNES  I’m not sure I follow that. 
MURPHY  Okay. If Mr. Cunningham doesn’t testify in this 
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case, in your mind does that make the State’s job 
any more difficult or easier? 
CARNES  I would think it would be more difficult. 
MURPHY  If he does not testify? 
CARNES  Yes, because they have to prove him innocent or 
guilty. I would think that he would have to testify, 
or need to. 
MURPHY  Okay. You understand that the State only has to 
prove guilt. They don’t have to prove innocence.  
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  And is it your expectation or is it your thinking now 
that we would have to prove that Mr. Cunningham 
is innocent? 
CARNES  Do I think you would have to prove it? 
MURPHY  Yes.  
CARNES  Yes, I thought that is what you would be trying to 
do.  
MURPHY  Trying to prove that he’s innocent? 
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  Do you understand that the burden of proof is on the 
State?  
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  Not us?  
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  You would still expect him, or us, to prove Mr. 
Cunningham is innocent. Correct? 
CARNES  Yes.  
WOLFE  I would ask for a clarification on the law on that, 
your Honor. 
COURT  Ms. Carnes—
CARNES  He’s getting me very confused. 
COURT  Okay. Let me explain to you. I think I told you that 
Mr. Cunningham has entered a plea of not guilty.  
CARNES  Yes.  
COURT  And under the law of North Carolina, the fact that 
he has been charged with a crime is not evidence of 
his guilt. He is not required to prove his innocence; 
he is presumed to be innocent. 
CARNES  Okay.  
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COURT  The State of North Carolina has the burden of proof, 
and that burden is to prove each element of the 
offense of which he is charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Now, the law also says that Mr. Cunningham 
does not have to testify in his own behalf. He 
doesn’t have to call any witnesses or present any 
other form of evidence, and that you cannot hold 
that against him. Do you understand that? 
CARNES  Yes, ma’am. 
COURT  Can you follow that law? 
CARNES  Yes, ma’am. 
COURT  Mr. Murphy? 
MURPHY  All right. Now, that’s what I’m asking you, Ms. 
Carnes. The judge told you what the law is, and I 
think the district attorney also said the same thing to 
you. I thought I had explained that. I thought I said 
that. Now, the question is your ability to follow that 
law.  
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  And that’s what I’m asking you. That given your 
understanding at this point—and I trust that that is 
clear – is it your feeling that Mr.—we at this table 
would have to prove to you that Mr. Cunningham is 
innocent of this offense?
CARNES  Yes.  
MURPHY  We offer her for cause. 
WOLFE  Object, Your Honor. 
COURT  Did you understand the explanation? 
CARNES  Yes, ma’am. 
COURT  And in light of my explanation that he is presumed 
to be innocent and is not required to prove his 
innocence, you would still require him to testify or 
to prove his innocence? 
CARNES  Right now he is innocent, or he is innocent until 
proven guilty. I understand that. But you are saying 
I need to—I’m sorry, I’m not sure. 
COURT  You need to slow down just a little bit. 
CARNES  He is innocent until proven guilty. I understand that, 
until he is proven guilty, before we can say he is 
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guilty. That, I understand. 
COURT  Which part is it that you don’t understand? 
CARNES  Well, I thought I understood everything. 
COURT  Well, I told you that he is not required to prove his 
innocence. 
CARNES  Then I guess that means his attorney will have to 
prove that he is not guilty? He doesn’t have to prove 
his innocence then—is that what you’re saying—
since he’s innocent until proven guilty? 
COURT  Let me start over. I told you that the fact that he has 
been charged with an offense is not evidence of his 
guilt. You can’t consider it as evidence of his guilt. 
I told you also that he is presumed to be innocent 
and is not required to prove his innocence. The State 
of North Carolina, represented by Mr. Wolfe and 
Ms. Brown, has the burden of proof. That burden is 
to prove each element of the offense with which Mr. 
Cunningham is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State has to carry that burden of proof and 
convince all twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt 
of each element of the offense before the jury may 
return a verdict of guilty. Mr. Cunningham is 
presumed to be innocent, and that presumption stays 
with him throughout the course of the trial unless 
the jury finds after they go into the jury room to 
deliberate that the State has carried its burden of 
proof. The law also says that Mr. Cunningham does 
not have to testify. He does not have to call any 
witnesses on his behalf or present any evidence. He 
is not required to prove his innocence. And that 
you, as a juror, cannot hold that against him. Do 
you understand that? 
CARNES  Yes.  
COURT  Were you confused? 
CARNES  Yes.  
COURT  I’m going to deny the challenge for cause at this 
point.  
MURPHY  Okay. Ms. Carnes, it is not my purpose to try to 
confuse you. That’s why I want you to stop me 
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when we go along. If you don’t understand anything 
that I have said, or if you need further clarification, 
stop me and we will ask the judge to do that because 
we don’t want a confused juror. We want a juror 
who is clear with what they have to do. Okay?  
CARNES  Okay.  
MURPHY  Now, I do, however, want to pursue that with you 
just a little bit because I want to know how you feel 
about the matter and not just telling me things 
because you think that’s what I want to hear. Okay? 
Because it’s not what I want to hear; it’s how you 
honestly feel about things. And what I want you to 
tell me is that if you would require the defendant to 
prove his innocence to you. 
CARNES  No.  
MURPHY  You would be satisfied then just to hear from the 
State and rely, if necessary, just on what the State 
presents to you on the guilt or innocence phase 
before you would return a verdict. Is that correct?  
WOLFE  Object.  
MURPHY  Well, the State has the burden. 
WOLFE  That is an improper statement of the law. 
COURT  Sustained as to form. 
MURPHY  I will rephrase the question. Can you require the 
State to prove to you, if they can, Mr. 
Cunningham’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?  
CARNES  Well, if I understand what they are saying, they 
have to prove he is guilty and not require his 
innocence to be proven. He doesn’t have to prove 
his innocence, I guess, is what I’m trying to say.  
MURPHY  And would you accept that? I mean—
CARNES  Yes, if he doesn’t want to prove his innocence, I 
would have to accept that. 
MURPHY  Okay.  
WOLFE  May we approach the bench just a minute, Your 
Honor?  
COURT  Yes.  
MURPHY  I guess I’m a little bit confused myself at this point, 
Ms. Carnes. Let’s see if we can understand each 
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other. Okay? You had indicated something to the 
effect that if we didn’t want to prove his innocence, 
that you would accept what the State offered?  
CARNES  I understand that he is innocent right now until 
proven guilty. So if they prove him guilty, I would 
accept the fact that he is guilty, if they prove him to 
be guilty. 
MURPHY  Okay. I guess I didn’t understand what you meant 
when you said if we didn’t want to prove his 
innocence. 
CARNES  And then I said until they prove him guilty. When 
they prove him guilty, then he is guilty, when they 
prove he is guilty. 
MURPHY  Okay. When you say when they prove him guilty, 
what do you mean? 
CARNES  When they prove that he did it, when they come up 
with all of the evidence that he did it. 
MURPHY  I suppose I’m having some problems with that. It 
sounds like you expect them to do that. 
WOLFE  Object.  
CARNES  No, I don’t. I said—
COURT  Sustained. 
CARNES  Well, I should have said if they do. 
COURT  Ms. Carnes, let me say when there is an objection, 
you need to stop talking.
 
